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DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT 
CIVIL LIBERTIES. By Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 1983. Pp. x, 512. $29.95. 
Facts are ventriloquists' dummies. Sitting on a wise man's knee they may 
be made to utter words of wisdom; elsewhere, they say nothing, or talk 
nonsense. 1 
In Dimensions of Tolerance Herbert McClosky2 and Alida Brill3 
present data about community attitudes toward civil liberties. The 
data are drawn from questionnaires the authors distributed to several 
thousand adult Americans eliciting the respondent's beliefs regarding 
freedom and tolerance. The findings are interesting, but the analysis is 
inadequate. The data presented in Dimensions of Tolerance deserve a 
more thoughtful and scholarly treatment than they receive in this 
book. 
Dimensions of Tolerance begins with a discussion of liberty - "a 
frail and tenuous reed, slow to take root, rare, and often short-lived" 
(p. 13). Liberty, we are told, must be balanced continually against the 
need for control, and total freedom is not invariably a social good. 
The authors' stated goal is to discover the influences which "prompt 
some men and women to honor and protect civil liberties, while others 
give priority to obedience and conformity" (p. 4). 
Quick1y, however, a bias appears. To the authors, "silencing revo-
lutionaries and extremists violates a fundamental principle of freedom, 
since freedom depends on a mutual obligation to grant to others what 
one claims for oneself" (p. 16). The problem, as the authors see it, is 
how to persuade "political or religious zealots that their own liberty, 
and that of the nation itself, is jeopardized by denying liberty to others 
. [ o ]r that politics and civility depend upon mutual obligations 
... " (p. 17). 
These statements suggest that society opts either for freedom or for 
control, and the bulk of Dimensions of Tolerance examines why some 
people do not opt for freedom. But this dichotomy is simplistic. 
"Speech advocating violent overthrow . . . ," Robert Bork has writ-
ten, is "not political speech because it violates constitutional truths 
about processes and because it is not aimed at a new definition of polit-
ical truth by a legislative majority."4 It may be argued plausibly that 
1. A. HUXLEY, nME Musr HAVE A STOP 301 (1944). 
2. Herbert McClosky is well known as a critic and analyst of American politics and culture. 
His landmark study, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 361 
(1964), found that politically active and influential individuals are more likely to respect the civil 
rights of minority groups and interests than are less politically active individuals. Id. at 373-74. 
McClosky is currently Research Director at the Survey Research Center in Berkeley and profes-
sor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. 
3. Alida Brill is Program Director and Scholar in Residence at the Russell Sage Foundation. 
4. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1971). 
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obscenity, libel, and the expression of totalitarian or racist sentiments 
may be proscribed by a polity without liberty being trampled under-
foot. 5 It is not meaningful to say on the one hand that freedom and 
control must be balanced and then to assert (as the authors do) that 
there is one libertarian norm to which all Americans should subscribe. 
Nevertheless, the authors assume -implicitly that one viewpoint, which 
sees tolerance as the preeminent value, is both "correct" and central to 
the idea of American democracy. In fact, they label what they are 
studying "The Learning of Civil Libertarian Norms" (p. 232). The 
potential complexity of the authors' conclusions is thus hobbled by 
their overly simplistic assumption as to the very nature of tolerance. 
What Mcclosky and Brill provide are correlations. Ideology and 
tolerance are correlated: conservatives are less libertarian than liber-
als. Age and tolerance are correlated: older people are less libertarian 
than younger people. Psychological traits are also analyzed: misan-
thropic people are less tolerant than sympathetic people. Other fac-
tors are examined: educated people are more tolerant than the less 
educated, and nonreligious people are more tolerant than those more 
religious. The only possibly relevant factor that seems to have been 
omitted is economic status. The amount of information assembled is 
quite impressive, and will no doubt be of great use to other social theo-
rists and scholars. 
As the authors admit, however, to learn that one factor (e.g., age) 
is correlated with opinions on tolerance does not prove that the factor 
caused the correlation. Growing old, for example, does not necessarily 
cause a shift away from libertarianism: "[a]ge may also reflect the 
historical period or Zeitgeist through which an individual has lived, 
the events of which have presumably affected and perhaps significantly 
altered his or her attitudes ... " (p. 398). All too often, the statistics 
seem to lead nowhere. For example, although the mass public is likely 
to support libertarian values in the abstract, it is less likely than com-
munity leaders or "elites" (people who occupy positions of influence 
and power) to support those values when applied to specific situations. 
While ninety percent of the people polled agreed with the statement, 
"I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be" 
(p. 50), when the question was whether a community should allow the 
American Nazi party to use its town hall to hold a public meeting, a 
much higher proportion of the mass public than of the community 
elite answered in the negative (p. 53). The implications of these statis-
tics are intriguing; from a civil libertarian standpoint, it might be pref-
erable to discourage the mass electorate from participating in the 
political process. On the other hand, it may be the process of political 
involvement that creates tolerance. As another example, it is interest-
5. See generally Bollinger, The Slrokie Legacy: Reflections on an ''Easy Case" and Free 
Speech Theory (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982). 
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ing to learn that people who oppose abortion also tend to oppose por-
nography, sexual freedom, and homosexual rights (p. 334), but the 
causes of these beliefs are still unexplored. Unfortunately, this book 
does not - perhaps cannot - provide answers to many of the ques-
tions it raises. When the authors do reach conclusions, it often ap-
pears that they have failed to consider the complexities of the issues 
with which they deal. Regarding abortion, they state: 
[O]ne has reason to dou~t that most anti-abortionists are principally mo-
tivated by convictions about the "right to life." For example, 81 percent 
of the anti-abortionists among the community leaders and 74 percent of 
those in the general population support capital punishment. [P. 334.] 
This correlation does not necessarily undercut the "right to life" justi-
fication. Attitudes toward life and death and law and order are not as 
simple as the authors imply. 
The authors' research also reveals some startling differences be-
tween the mass public and the "elite." The researchers asked, "[i]f a 
news photographer takes pictures of a famous person entering a house 
of prostitution, [should] publishing the photos . . . be permitted . . . 
[or] forbidden as an invasion of privacy" (p. 62)? While a significant 
majority of the legal elite and community leaders would allow publica-
tion, a nearly identical percentage of the mass public would forbid it. 
McCloskey and Brill use these statistics to support their thesis that 
community leaders and elites are more tolerant and more in accord 
with current legal standards than is the general public (p. 64). What is 
interesting, however, is that the question requires a choice between 
two values - a free press versus the right of privacy - each of which 
might be seen as libertarian. The statistic suggests that the general 
public values the right to privacy more highly than do those more 
knowledgeable about social "norms." If borne out by other evidence,6 
this might suggest that both the law and the community elite are be-
hind, rather than ahead of, the general public in appreciating this lib-
ertarian value. 
Another interesting statistic reveals that while only six percent of 
the mass public believes that "[u]sing violence to achieve political 
goals is sometimes the only way to get injustices corrected," eleven 
percent of the community leaders and sixteen percent of the legal elite 
agreed with the statement (p. 75). Fully one-quarter of the legal elite 
declined to declare the use of violence always wrong. This may, in one 
sense, show the increased "tolerance" of elites, but it may also indicate 
6. This thesis is given some support by another statistic in Dimensions of Tolerance. Twenty-
eight percent of the mass public agreed with this statement: 
When applying for a job, a person's prison record should be kept confidential since the ex-
convict deserves a chance to make a fresh start. 
Only 19% of the co=unity leaders, and 14% of the legal elite, agreed with the statement. P. 
194. These results could indicate a greater regard for privacy among the mass public than in the 
other groups 
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that the more experience people have with the legislative and judicial 
processes of this country the less faith they have that those processes 
work effectively.7 As with other correlations in the book, the authors 
merely begin the search for understanding. 
Dimensions of Tolerance, then, is flawed, but it remains very useful. 
The book's value lies not in its lengthy second-hand summaries of the 
constitutional status of certain civil liberties in 1977,8 or in its general-
izations, which are of questionable validity. For example, the authors 
refer to the "low level of political interest displayed by vast numbers of 
the American people" (p. 418) although McClosky himself has previ-
ously refuted this common misconception.9 The value of this book lies 
in its wealth of useful and thought-provoking information. The statis-
tics and correlations are there; the truly thoughtful and revealing con-
clusions remain to be drawn. 
7. It is also worth noting that the sizable minority of lawyers who do not completely reject 
the use of violence in the pursuit of justice is hard to reconcile with the authors' assertion else-
where that "lawyers are more disposed than any other segment of the population to adjust their 
beliefs to the rulings of the higher courts." P. 419. The higher state courts have not been hospi-
table to civil disobedience even when nonviolent. See, e.g., State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 472-
73, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973) (even nonviolent illegal behavior is unacceptable except under ex-
tremely unusual circumstances). 
8. Chapters 2 through 5 of Dimensions of Tolerance summarize the results of the authors' 
research in four discrete sections: "The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and Press"; "The 
First Amendment: Symbolic Speech, Conduct, Assembly, and Religion"; "The Rights of Due 
Process"; and ''The Rights of Privacy and Lifestyle." Each section begins with a summary of the 
legal status of the right in question which McClosky and Brill based on memorandums prepared 
for them in 1977. The summaries are outdated, oversimplified, and of use only to the lay reader. 
9. McClosky wrote: 
The few cross-national studies conducted so far indicate, however, that despite the low 
[ voter] turnout, other indexes of participation - political interest and awareness, expressed 
party affiliation, sense of political competence, etc. - tend to be higher in the United States 
than in many other countries, such as France and Italy. 
Political Participation, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (D. 
Sills ed. 1968). 
